During this period, Portugal and Spain, two very important countries in European history, were not admitted to the European Council because the Salazar and Franco regimes were still in power. Turkey was most definitely a Muslim country back then, but democracy was more important than religion. Unlike today, there were no claims that Turkey would never become European because of its Muslim identity and religious and cultural differences. Turkey brought its religious and cultural differences to the attention of Europe with its military coups, lack to honor human rights and freedom, lack to stabilize democracy and lack to transfer to a free-market economy. They probably thought if Turkey can’t realize the opportunities bestowed to her for almost a half century to develop, strengthen, and democratize, then it’s probably because of her religious and cultural differences.

In 1957 Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg formed the Common Market or European Economic Community (EEC), which later grew and became the European Union. In August of 1959, Turkey, which was known as a European country, applied to the EEC to become the eighth member after Greece. Turkey’s application was welcomed and accepted as a natural right. Like the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was considered a democratic country of Western Europe in 1947, 1949, 1952 and 1959. Today, however, Europe is debating Turkey’s exclusion from the union.

Liberal democracy and the market economy

The six countries which formed the Common Market then had a rich population of two million with high consumption habits. It was the second richest market after the United States. The market was a great opportunity and support for countries that wanted to sell profitable and marketable goods, improve and industrialize its economy. For example Japan and South Korea rapidly developed and industrialized by taking advantage of America’s profitable market. Turkey’s potential approval to the Common Market would have created a strong environment for capital and technology to come to Turkey.

The first Common Market membership requirement was implementing a democratic structure that protected human rights and freedoms and the second requirement was having a free-market economy. The Common Market intended to diminish the differences in the economy, the customs union, and development levels of countries that would join the European Union in the future.

At the time Turkey applied to join the EEC, the Democrat Party was in power. The DP supported a free-market economy in principle. It took economic precautions on August 4 1958 to support economic liberalization. Its relations with the Common Market forced it to transfer to a free-market economy.

Shortly after Turkey applied in August 1959, it entered a period of political instability that ultimately led to the military coup of May 1960.

Common Market Suffers from Coups

During Turkey’s negotiation process, a military intervention was launched on May 27 1960. Since Western democracy mandates armed forced to be under civil control, the EEC halted negotiations with Turkey because it had downgraded the power of democracy and implemented military rule.

The military’s efforts to continue negotiations were unsuccessful. After the execution of Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan in 1961, De Gaulle and Foreign Affairs Minister C. De Mourville refused to continue negotiations, saying they would not speak with the men that killed their initial addressees and completely ended negotiations.  The military intervention not only damaged the political administration, but its’ dominating economic mentality as well. The coup implemented a socialist planned economy system that contradicted a free-market economy, and silenced intellectuals by launching defamation campaigns.

EEC Representative Hans Von Der Groeben criticized the coup, saying a Common Market country must detach the economy from the state. However Turkey’s memorandum clearly states that it plans to improve its controlled economy and this is against the Rome Treaty.

After Turkey gave the impression that it had returned to democracy, the EEC re-opened negotiations on July 24 1961. Unfortunately, Turkey had lost two years because of the coup. Meanwhile, Greece, a country that did not experience a military coup, had completed its negotiations on March 6 1961 and entered the “preparation” period. The Ankara Treaty, which promised to fulfill the same responsibilities as did the Athena Treaty, could not implement it until September 1963. Unlike the Athena Treaty, Ankara’s treaty was promised a $210 million financial support over the course of five years for development. The dollar was valued much higher then. The annual aid was more than one tenth of Turkey’s net export profit. Financial support continued throughout the five years after the Supplementary Protocol.

The blows of the military intervention were not limited to May 27, 1960. Following the March 12, 1971 coup, EEC members made the first claims of Turkey’s violation of human rights. Execution decisions and relations halted negotiations once again.

Ankara Treaty, Supplementary Protocol and Contents

The Ankara Treaty that was signed two years after Greece signed its treaty was in principle a Customs Union compromise. The second article foresaw a maximum of five year for preparation and a maximum of twelve years for transition before Turkey could begin its full membership accession process. If Turkey had not been hindered by the coup and had implemented the Ankara Treaty in 1961 like Greece, then it would have become a full member in 1978. The Partnership Treaty allowed industry products such as textile to enter the Common Market without customs fees during Turkey’s preparation period.

Free goods to Europe benefit

After Greek colonels launched a coup in 1967, Turkey became the only country allowed to export goods to the Common Market region without customs. This status along with the investment of foreign capital allowed Turkey to rapidly develop its industrial sector. However, to be able to export free goods Turkey would have to implement free-market economy standards, overcome obstacles in protecting the value of the Turkish lira, and accept an export policy based on the private sector. Turkey would be able to export goods such as motorcycles and cars to the German market for much less and without customs fees. Unfortunately, however, the May 27 coup regime implemented a controlled economy, instead of a liberal fiscal legislation. The coup regime’s plan was isolated and focused on import. In other words, Turkey could not export cars to Germany, but it could import cars with customs fees.

As this mentality became embedded in Turkey, the implementation of the Supplementary Protocol was delayed. As a result of the March 1971 coup, the transition period that was scheduled for 1966 was not realized until 1973.

In spite of all these delays, the Common Market adopted a new policy in 1978 to return to prior status and recommended the then prime minister Ecevit to apply for full membership.

Mr. Ecevit, who was influenced by the political economy ideology introduced during the coup, defended the mentality that Turkey would be the market while the other countries would be the community in the Common Market and denied the offer. After Demirel became prime minister in 1979, the late Hayrettin Erkmen became the foreign affairs minister. Erkmen took initiative to apply for full membership in October 1980. However, Erkmen was forced to resign due to conflict with Mr. Erbakan. While Turkey had placed full membership back on its agenda, a military intervention was launched on September 12 1980 and relations were cut off until 1987.

Turkey lost its opportunity for modernity  

If the coup had not introduced different political and economic ideologies and Turkey had implemented its partnership agreement, Turkey would have entered a rapid industrialization and development process in 1961. If Turkey had not experienced political and economic instability, over ten million Turks would have had the opportunity to live and work in Western European countries. The average income per capital in 2007 would be at least equal to Greece’s with $20,000. Turkey’s democracy and human rights would be far more developed and stable. This type of Turkey would have been more powerful, respected and intimidating not only in Europe but in the world.

Turkey has lost great opportunities. Although its full membership bid was re-launched in 1999, the current circumstances and requirements are more complicated and demanding. The events in Turkey dating back to the 1960 military coup prove that the biggest obstacle in Turkey membership to the EU has been the lack of civil control over the military. If the same pattern continues in Turkey, not only will Turkey lose the right to become a member of the European Union, an endeavor of Turkey’s since 1856, it will also lose its stance as a party in the European political arena.